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Abstract. Information security decisions typically involve a trade-off
between security and productivity. In practical settings it is often the
human/user who is best positioned to make this trade-off decision, or in
fact has a right to make its own decision (such as in the case of ‘bring
your own device’). It then may be useful to discuss approaches which
aim to influence the user decision, while leaving end responsibility with
the user. This is often referred to as nudging the user, or, more gener-
ally, as influencing human behavior. The main aim of this paper is to
provide a generic formalization to facilitate rigorous quantitative analy-
sis of influencing information security behavior, providing a theoretical
basis for studying, optimizing, comparing and evaluating approaches. In
particular, we propose an agent-based formalization that captures the
human decision maker as well as the influencer and the relationship be-
tween them. Within this formalization we will characterize an optimal
policy for influencing and formally prove that such policies are optimal.
We then embed multi-criteria decision making into our formalism as an
approach to model human behavior and to choose between alternatives.
We apply our formalization by deriving optimal policies for the selection
of WiFi networks, in which the graphical user interface aims to nudge
the user to particular security behavior.
1 Introduction
People continuously make information security decisions: should I use this wire-
less, should I put this person’s USB stick in my laptop, how do I choose and
memorize passwords? Almost always, the decision involves a trade-off between
security and other concerns, such as being able to complete an important task
or being able to easily do something that otherwise could be cumbersome. The
decisions are often complex, with several objectives to be considered simultane-
ously, and the optimal decision may very much depend on the specific situation:
while using a stranger’s USB stick is not advisable, the importance of the job to
be completed and/or knowledge about the owner of the USB stick may make it
advisable to put the USB stick in one’s laptop, despite the associated information
security risks.
In situations such as above, a simple compliance policy (such as, not to allow
USB sticks) would be suboptimal. Instead, one would want to allow some freedom
for the owner of the laptop to decide the best course of action. In general terms,
unless one can specify a compliance policy that is optimal under all possible
circumstances, there is room for improvement by allowing the user to make the
final decision. There exist other situations in which the user should play a role
in the decision making. For instance, in case of BYOD (bring your own device)
[5], where the device owner uses their own device for work-related activities, the
fact that the user owns the device puts certain restrictions on what the employer
can decide without the owner’s input.
In all these situations the end user is involved in the information security
decision making, and is in fact end responsible. Then, and this is key for this
paper, it may be advisable that service providers (telecoms, online banks), device
vendors, employers, or other parties are able to influence the decision making,
without restricting the end user. In the literature this is often referred to as
nudging [19]. Nudging leaves the choice with the user, but aims to influence
the decision so that the user is more likely to make a beneficial decision, e.g., by
presenting choices in a particular manner that aims to impact the choice a person
ends up making. There are many aspects to nudging that deserve discussion, but
in this paper we do not debate the specific approach, but aim to derive results
for influencing in general.
To our knowledge there is no formal definition of nudge or similar concept of
influencing exists, even though recently in [9], Heilmann presented schematically
the nudge success conditions from perspective of influencing autonomous system,
also called System 1 (and not reflective, also called System 2) [11], and showed
the difference of these conditions for different types of nudges with respect to
taxonomy of Bovens [3].
This paper provides a formalization of the concept of influencing that is as
general as possible while assuring it is intuitive and useful. We believe such for-
malization is necessary to enable a solid quantitative treatment of optimization,
comparison and evaluation of influencing approaches. In particular, we want to
be able to apply mathematical optimization to decision making as well as to
the decision on how to influence, and for that we need a rigorous underpinning
and understanding of the problem at hand. We also want to understand how
different variants of influencing behavior relate to each other, and the current
literature [19] that introduces approaches in informal (albeit reasonably pre-
cise) language will always leave room for interpretation and misunderstanding.
Finally, we want to be able to evaluate the level of success of influencing behav-
iors, be it experimentally or theoretically–again, a formal framework allows us
to define the experimental or theoretical setting under which we carry out the
evaluation. This paper will not reach all these goals, but provide the underlying
quantitative framework, with an emphasis on the application of optimization
techniques.
Our formalization follows naturally from the above scenarios: we present
(in Section 2) an agent-based formalization, in which the decision maker and
influencer are agents that influence each other. We associate with agents (i) an
observation by the agent of the environment that cannot be altered, although
uncertainty about the environment can exist within the agent, and (ii) a context
that is subject to attempts to be influenced. Given environment and context,
a probabilistic policy is formulated that represents decisions (by the decision
maker agent) as well as the approach to influencing (by the influencer agent);
we introduce a notion of effect, which, up to a point, can modify decisions made
by the decision maker. We prove that we can formally characterize the optimal
policy using an impact function.
In Section 3 we embed Multi-Criteria Decision Making into our formalism,
since it provides a natural way to discuss optimization of decisions, both for the
decision maker and the influencer. We illustrate our formalism and its merits
using a WiFi scenario taken from [20] in Section 4. In the WiFi example, a
device user decides between networks and the device presents choices so as to
influence the decision of the device user. In this case, the decision maker agent
represents the device user and the influencer agent represents the way the device
presents the choices. We will show optimal policies for the WiFi example and
show that based on the uncertainty of the decision-maker as well as influencer,
different effects can be optimal. In particular, we show that it is possible that it
is better for the influencer not to attempt to influence the decision-maker, thus
illustrating that there can be such a thing as ‘too much security’. It also shows
that our framework facilitates thinking about more flexible enforcement of secu-
rity policies. Finally, Section 6 discusses possible extensions of the framework,
in particular considering explicit time and multiple influencers.
2 Formalization of Influence
We consider here a multi-agent system, where each agent can make a decision at
each step. An important characteristic of an agent is to have a partial view of the
environment through its sensors, and on which it can have an impact through
its actions. We first present a model considering a single decision-maker and a
single influencer, in order to focus on the relationship between these two agents,
and we propose in Section 5 different extensions of this basic model, including
explicit times and multiple influencers.
2.1 Environment, Observation and Context
We write E for the set of possible environments, and given an agent ai, we write
Θi for the set of observations available to ai, and Θ = ∪iΘi for the set of all
possible observations. Intuitively, an observation represents a partial view of the
environment, different for different agents. We encode the relationship between
environments and observations through the probabilities p(e | θ) and p(θ | e),
representing the conditional probabilities of being in the environment e when
observing θ and of observing θ when being in the environment e.
We also write Ci for the set of contexts available to ai and C = ∪iCi for the
set of all contexts. Intuitively, an observation corresponds to a probe from real-
world information, and as such, cannot be changed, but can be uncertain, while
a context is defined within the agent, and as such can be modified, as described
later in this section. The separation between observation and context is part of
the modelling process, and can change from one system to another, depending
on the assumptions considered. In the WiFi scenario, an observation can for
instance include the strength of the signal or the level of trust of a network
(which can be uncertain), while a context might include the color in which the
networks are displayed.
2.2 Decision-Maker
A decision-maker is an agent responsible for selecting an alternative, given an
observation and a context. We write Ai for the set of alternatives available to
ai, such that Ai 6= ∅, meaning that an agent has always at least one alternative
possible (such an alternative could be reduced to a skip action, i.e., an action
with no impact on the environment).
A decision-maker is a probabilistic agent, thus allowing for the modelling of
groups of users rather than single users. More formally, a decision-maker is an
agent ai associated with a policy
1 pii : Θi × Ci → P(Ai).
We say that a decision-maker is deterministic given an observation θi and a
context ci whenever there is an alternative b such that
2 pii(θi, ci, b) = 1. In this
case, we abuse the notation and write pii(θi, ci) = b.
2.3 Influencer
An effect is a unary function that can modify the context of an agent. Given an
agent ai, we say that an effect applicable to ai is a function η : Ci → Ci, and
we write Ni for the set of effects applicable to ai. For the sake of generality, we
assume that Ni is closed under composition, i.e., if η ∈ Ni and η′ ∈ Ni, then
η ◦ η′ ∈ Ni.
An influencer is a deterministic agent (as we will explain) responsible for
selecting an effect over ai at each time. Such an agent does not use any context
to choose an effect, preventing it by construction to be influenced. However, as
we discuss in Section 5, we do not see this as a limitation, but rather as a design
choice, in order to avoid influencing loops. In addition, without loss of generality,
we assume that an influencer can only influence a single agent, since influencing
multiple agents can be simulated by several influencers, one for each influenced
agent.
1 Given a set X, we write P(X) for the probability space associated with X, i.e., for
the set of functions f : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X f(x) = 1
2 Strictly speaking, we should write pii(θi, ci)(b), however, for the sake of clarity, we use
here the curried notation for probability functions, and we write pii(θi, ci, b) instead.
The motivation of this approach is to analyse how an agent behaves when
influenced, and to evaluate whether this influence is beneficial or not. Hence,
although a decision-maker can be probabilistic, denoting a possible behaviour
of the agent, the application of effects should somehow be deterministic, so that
given one decision-maker, there is a single agent corresponding to the influenced
decision-maker. Hence, an influencer is not a probabilistic agent, and determin-
istically selects an effect (that can be composed of several effects, or reduced to
the identity function) to apply at each time.
More formally, an influencer over a decision-maker ai is an agent aj associated
with a policy pij : Θj → Aj , such that Aj ⊆ Ni. In this case, we write aj B ai.
We also write pij(θj) to denote the specific effect ηj when agent aj observes θj .
Note that Ai does not change with the application of effects. In other words,
influencing an agent does not change the set of alternatives possible for that
agent. However, an effect can change the probability of an alternative to change
from 0 to a value strictly positive, which in practice means that this alter-
native had no chances to be selected before the effect, and is possible after.
Hence, although we do not consider here the dynamic creation/suppression of
alternatives, our approach is flexible approach to consider the dynamic activa-
tion/deactivation of alternatives.
2.4 Influence
The raw impact of an influencer can be measured in a differential way: given an
observation θj for aj , we say that aj has an impact on ai whenever pii(θi, ηj(ci)) 6=
pii(θi, ci). In other words, aj has an impact on ai if and only if ai would behave
differently without aj .
The above only measures a difference in behaviour, but does not indicate
whether the influence is in the direction desired by aj . Hence, we introduce a
impact function ρi : E × Ai → R such that, given an environment e and an
alternative b, ρi(e, b) represents the impact of ai selecting b. In the rest of the
paper, we consider that the impact function intuitively represents a cost on the
system, and as such, the aim of an influencer is to minimize the impact, i.e., a
lower impact is ‘better’. Note, the impact function should be seen as an ideal
valuation of the possible alternatives, and as a way to evaluate the behaviour of
the agents, rather than as a way to define the behaviour of the agents.
Definition 1. Given a decision-maker ai with an observation θi and a context
ci, the impact on an environment e of an effect η is given by δi(θi, e, η), defined
as follows:
δi(θi, e, η) =
∑
b∈Ai
pii(θi, η(ci), b) ρi(e, b)
We can now define the global impact of an influencer in a given environment,
which depends on the probabilities of the observations made by the influencer
and the decision maker.
Definition 2. Given an environment e, the global impact of an influencing pol-
icy pij from the agent aj over ai is defined as:
∆
pij
i (e) =
∑
θj∈Θj
p(θj | e)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pij(θj))
Note that Definition 2 assumes that for any given environment, the agents make
statistically independent observations (of course, this does not imply different
or arbitrary observations are made, but only implies that p(θi, θj | e) = p(θi |
e)p(θj | e)). This is justified by the design of the formalism, in which dependence
between agents is through context, not through observations.
2.5 Optimal Influencer
We say that a policy for an influencer is optimal whenever it minimizes the
expected impact of the influencer.
Definition 3. A policy pij for an influencer aj is optimal if, and only if, for
any other policy pi′j: ∑
e∈E
p(e)∆
pij
i (e) ≤
∑
e∈E
p(e)∆
pi′j
i (e)
In an ideal setting, the influencer knows both the environment e and the
observation made by the decision-maker θi, and so can simply select the effect
η that minimizes δi(θi, e, η).
Proposition 1 The optimal policy for aj such that aj B ai is defined by, for
any θj:
pi∗j (θj) = arg min
η∈Aj
[∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, η)
]
The proof can be found in Appendix A, and roughly speaking, relies on the
application of Bayes’ Theorem over p(e) · p(θj | e).
2.6 Extreme Influencers
In practice, the probabilities of p(e | θj) and p(θi | e) might not be known by
aj , in which case the policy pi
∗
j cannot be computed. In this case, the influencer
can only make a decision based on its own observation θj of the environment.
Let us consider two extreme strategies: non-influence and forced influence.
We write id for the neutral effect (i.e., id(c) = c, for any context c) and piid
for the policy such that piid(θj) = id . The impact of this policy is given by:
∆piidi (e) =
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e)
∑
b∈Ai
pii(θi, c, b) ρi(e, b)
We say that a policy pij is beneficial for ai if, and only if,
∑
e∈E p(e)∆
pij
i (e) is
lower than
∑
e∈E p(e)∆
piid
i (e). In other words, an influencer is beneficial if, and
only if, its impact is better than applying no effect. It is worth observing that
as long as the effect id is available to an influencer for all observations, then the
optimal strategy is always beneficial.
Another extreme strategy is for the influencer to force the decision-maker
towards a specific alternative. Let us first assume that for each alternative b ∈ Ai,
there exists an effect ηb such that pii(θi, ηb(c), b) = 1, for any observation θi and
any context c. In other words, ηb forces ai to select b. A forcing influence for an
influencer aj could then be to select the effect forcing towards the alternative it
believes to be the best.
Let us now assume that aj knows the probability function p(e | θj), then we
can define the forced influence policy:
piF (θj) = ϕbmin where bmin = arg min
b∈Ai
∑
e∈E
p(e | θj) · ρi(e, b)
and it follows that the impact of this policy is given by, for any environment e:
∆piFi (e) =
∑
θj∈Θj
p(θj | e)
[
min
b∈Ai
∑
e′∈E
p(e′ | θj) ρi(e′, b)
]
It is worth observing that when aj has a perfect knowledge of the environ-
ment, i.e., when given an observation θj , there is a single environment e such
that such that p(e | θj) = 1, then ∆piFi (e) = minb∈Ai ρi(e, b) is clearly minimal.
In other words, when the influencer has perfect knowledge of the environment
and has the possibility of forcing the decision-maker to select a given alternative,
then doing so is optimal. Conversely, when either of the above conditions is not
met, the traditional approach of forcing the decision maker to follow a particular
alternative is not necessarily optimal.
3 Analysis of the Alternatives
In order to model human decision making and to evaluate the different alterna-
tives for a decision-maker, we consider Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).
MCDA is particularly useful in situations where alternatives are evaluated on
multiple, often conflicting, criteria, in search of solutions that represent the best
trade-off(s) between these criteria. In information security, this trade-off is usu-
ally between security and productivity/usability, for instance, deciding between
a more secure network and a faster one.
We first present the basics of MCDA and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
(MAUT). We then detail how to define the impact function and the policy of a
decision maker, an d finally, we illustrate this approach for the WiFi example.
3.1 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
Multi-attribute utility theory [13] is an MCDA approach that assumes that de-
cision makers maximize their implicit utility function. MAUT is a compensatory
technique, since it allows smaller values on a subset of criteria to be compensated
by a large value on a single criterion, and is based on expected utility theory with
some strong technical assumptions related to comparability, transitivity, conti-
nuity, and independence of outcomes (that assumes independence of criteria).
MAUT is attractive because of its sound theoretical foundations (based on ex-
pected utility theory), its non-monetary nature and as a basis for comparison of
new, not yet considered alternatives with the same utility function constructed
for the same decision maker. In addition, its natural approach to modeling risk
behavior is particularly attractive for designing security decisions, where risk
attitude of decision makers plays crucial role in their decision patterns.
In MCDA alternatives are evaluated and compared using a set of criteria G,
such that each criterion should be either minimized or maximized (the direction
of optimization). Each criterion comes with a scale, in which alternatives can
be compared. Typical scales include real numbers, intervals, ratios, binary or
verbal values (qualitative descriptions), which are ordered with respect to the
optimization direction. Each criterion g ∈ G is therefore associated with a scale
Kg, and we write gmin ∈ Kg and gmax ∈ Kg for the minimal and maximal values
of g. We write K = ⋃g∈G Kg for the set of all possible scales, and without any
loss of generality, we assume that all criteria are maximized (minimized criteria
can be simply multiplied by −1).
The values of alternatives for different criteria are provided through obser-
vations, environments and contexts. Since decision-makers and influencers use
different sources for these, for the sake of generality, we introduce an abstract set
of states S, such that, for any σ ∈ S, σ(g, b) denotes the value of the alternative
b for the criterion b.
The global value of an alternative is obtained by aggregating the value for
all criteria. However, before aggregation, these values must be normalized, in
order to compare comparable values. A normalization function, which in MAUT
corresponds to marginal utility function, is a function n : G × K → [0, 1]. This
function can change from one decision-maker to another, thus encoding some
notion of preference.
In addition, preferences can be encoded using criteria weights, which in
MAUT represent trade-offs between criteria. Here, a weight shows the relative
importance of the criterion, when compared to other criteria. In particular, it
defines how many units of one criterion can be traded-off for a unit of another
criterion. The criteria weights can change depending on the state, and therefore
we define the function w : S → P(G). We can now define the notion of MAUT
model.
Definition 4. A MAUT model is a tuple M = (A,G,S, n, w), where A is a set
of alternatives, G a set of criteria, S a set of states, n : G × K → [0, 1] is a
normalisation function and w : S → P(G) is a weight function.
After mapping all criteria utilities to their scales, normalizing them and defin-
ing weights, the alternatives can be evaluated. For aggregating marginal criteria
utilities for each alternative some form of aggregation function should be used,
e.g. multiplicative, additive or some combination of both is usually applied. We
will explain in Section 4.2 the relation between the criteria value and the impact
function that we used in our framework. For now, we introduce one of simplest
forms of aggregating evaluations on all criteria scores for each alternative is
weighted sum, which we will use in the WiFi example:
Definition 5 (Utility function). Given a model M = (A,G,S, n, w), the util-
ity of an alternative b ∈ A given a state σ ∈ S is defined as:
v(b, σ) =
∑
g∈G
w(σ, g) · n(g, σ(g, b)).
3.2 Decision Maker
We assume that decision makers are rational, and that they base their decision-
making process using a MAUT model. Following the separation between obser-
vation and context, we consider two distinct sets of criteria, GΘi and GCi . Fur-
thermore, a state consists of the union of the observation θi and of the context
ci, such that, intuitively, θi provides the value for the criteria in GΘi while ci
provides the value for the criteria in GCi . Hence, the set of states is defined as
Si = Θi ∪ Ci.
The model of a deterministic decision-maker ai is therefore a tuple Mi =
(Ai,GΘi ∪ GCi , Θi ∪ Ci, ni, wi), and given an observation θi and a context ci, the
policy of ai is defined as:
pii(θi, ci) = arg max
b∈Ai
v(b, θi ∪ ci).
Note that in order for ai to be deterministic, we assume the existence of an ar-
bitrary ordering over alternatives, so that if there are several alternatives maxi-
mizing the value function, ai selects the highest one according to that ordering.
In Section 2, we defined decision-makers to be probabilistic in order to ac-
count for a group of users instead of a single one. We model this aspect in MAUT
by considering a set W ⊆ (S → P(G)) equipped with a probability distribution
ψ : P(W ), such that, given a weight function w ∈ W , ψ(w) represents the
probability of w. We write piw to represent the policy of the deterministic agent
defined according to the weight function w, and the policy piW of the population
represented by (W,ψ) is defined as:
piW (θi, ci, b) =
∑
w∈W
{ψ(w) | piw(θi, ci) = b} (1)
3.3 Impact Function
The impact function ρi for a decision-maker ai defines the impact of each al-
ternative in an environment. In general, this function can be defined in many
different ways (for instance, through an access control policy stating which al-
ternatives are secure). We propose here to define it using a MAUT model, which
is however slightly different from the one defined above. Indeed, an important
aspect of the impact function is that it does not take the context into account.
Hence, given a set of alternativesAi, a set of criteria GΘi , a set of environments
E (providing the values for the criteria in GΘi ), a normalization function n and
a weight function w, we can define the model Mi = (Ai,GΘi , E , n, w). Note that
the functions n and w need not be equal to those of the decision-maker ai, and
in practice, such a difference can reflect a misalignment between the preferences
of the decision-maker and those of the influencer.
The impact function can then be defined directly as the utility function
v of Mi. However, in the context of information security, we want to clearly
distinguish the alternatives, so that there “good” and “bad” alternatives. Hence,
we define the impact function as, given an environment e and an alternative b:
ρi(e, b) =
{
0 if v¯(b, e) ≥ v¯(b′, e), for any b′,
1 otherwise.
In other words, an alternative has no impact if, and only if, it is maximal ac-
cording to the utility function.
4 Case study: Selection of a WiFi Network
As a case study, let us consider an example of nudging in choosing a wireless
network (WiFi). This is of particular interest in the context of BYOD, since
employees work on their own devices and define security protection of their
devices by themselves, thus potentially exposing sensitive information [18]. The
dangers of choosing non-secure Wi-Fi are well documented: it exposes device and
data transmitted to increased chances of spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks
[1], [16]. In general, over one billion workers will work remotely by 2015, over a
third of the total worldwide workforce [10]. A company that allows BYOD may
want to influence the employee so that the trade-off decision between security and
productivity is done in the company’s interest. Alternatively, users may want to
have nudging software on their phone to assist in making the information security
decisions for work as well as home use.
We introduced nudging in the security context of WiFi selection in [20]. There
the focus was on introducing the user interface design nudges, and evaluate them
with a user group. We consider here the traffic light effect [6], also used in framing
choices [4], which assumes that users tend to select items identified with the green
color, reject those identified with the red color, and do not differentiate when
the color is neutral.
Table 1. Decision matrix for θ1 = [s 7→ (1, 1), f 7→ (0, 2)], c1 = [s 7→ N, f 7→ N ]
criteria
trust strength color
{0, 1, 2} {0, 1, 2} {R,N,G} (scale)
t→ max r → max l→ max (direction)
0.5 0.3 0.2 (weights)
alternative
s 1 1 N
f 0 2 N
pii(θ1, c1) f
4.1 Decision-maker
Let us consider a user ai in a coffee-shop having to choose between two different
networks A = {s, f}: s is a secure network with weak signal; f is a public WiFi of
the coffee shop, with strong signal, but not necessary safe. We want to illustrate
with this example the trade-off between security and productivity/usability, and
therefore consider the set of criteria GΘi = {t, r}, indicating the trust and the
strength of the network, respectively, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the scales are defined as Kt = Kr = {0, 1, 2} (the higher the better).
Note that we consider here a simple and abstract notion of trust, and in
practice, this notion can be defined using the presence in the white list of WiFi
network providers predefined by security officer or system administrator of the
company or by the employee itself. More sophisticated evaluation of ‘trust’ cri-
terion may take into account current location of an employee [7].
We also consider a single context criterion GCi = {l}, which indicates the color
in which the name of the network is displayed, with a scale Kl = {R,N,G},
corresponding to red, neutral and green, respectively, and with the values 0, 0.5
and 1, respectively.
Finally, let us consider that the decision maker has the following weight
function, for any observation θ and any context c: w((θ, c), t) = 0.5, w((θ, c), r) =
0.3 and w((θ, c), l) = 0.2, meaning that connecting to a trusted WiFi is slightly
more important for the decision maker than choosing WiFi with strong signal.
The color of the presented name of a WiFi is less significant for the decision
maker. We also consider that ai uses linear normalization:
ni(g, θ, c) =
g − gmin
gmax − gmin . (2)
We use an extensional notation for observations, and we write θ = [s 7→
(v1, v2), f 7→ (v3, v4)] for the observation θ associating s with a trust of v1
and strength of v2, and f with a trust of v3 and a strength of v4. We use a
similar notation for contexts. Table 1 represents the traditional decision matrix
[2] for ai, for the observation θ1 = [s 7→ (1, 1), f 7→ (0, 2)], and the context
c1 = [s 7→ N, f 7→ N ]. We can therefore calculate the utility for each alternatives:
v(s, θ1, c1) = 0.5 ∗ 0.5 + 0.3 ∗ 0.5 + 0.2 ∗ 0.5 = 0.5
v(f, θ1, c1) = 0.5 ∗ 0 + 0.3 ∗ 1 + 0.2 ∗ 0.5 = 0.4
and it follows that ai selects s = pii(θ1, c1).
It is worth observing that the slight difference in the observation can lead
to a different final choice. For instance, consider the previous observation where
the trust of f is now equal to 1 (instead of 0), encoded by the observation θ2 =
[s 7→ (1, 1), f 7→ (1, 2)]. The utilities of the alternatives become v(s, θ2, c1) = 0.5
and v(f, θ2, c1) = 0.65, and therefore ai now selects f = pii(θ2, c1).
Finally, we can model a population of users using a set of weight functions,
instead of a single one. For instance, consider the set W = {w1, w2, w3} where,
for any observation θ and any context c: w1((θ, c), t) = 0.3, w1((θ, c), r) = 0.6 and
w1((θ, c), l) = 0.1; w2((θ, c), t) = 0.5, w2((θ, c), r) = 0.4, and w2((θ, c), l) = 0.1;
and w3((θ, c), t) = 0.3, w3((θ, c), r) = 0.3 and w3((θ, c), l) = 0.4. Let us consider
a probability function ψ such that ψ(w1) = ψ(w2) = ψ(w3) = 1/3. Then, we can
observe that piw1(θ1, c1) = f , piw2(θ1, c1) = s and piw3(θ1, c1) = s (the utility of s
and f are equal with w3, and we arbitrarily choose s), and therefore, following
Equation 1, we have piW (θ1, c1, f) = 1/3 and piW (θ1, c1, s) = 2/3.
4.2 Influencer
As described above, we consider a single context criterion l, corresponding to
the color in which a network is displayed. Hence, by construction, the set of
effects is limited to effects of the form ηxy, such that, given any context c,
ηxy(c) = [s 7→ x, f 7→ y].
From the example in the previous section, let us consider again the first ob-
servation θ1, where ai selects s with the neutral context c1, and let us now
consider the context c2 = ηRG(c1). The utilities of the alternatives become
v(s, θ1, c2) = 0.4 and v(f, θ1, c2) = 0.5, leading ai to select f : pii(θ1, c2) = f .
In other words, by changing the color of f to green and that of s to red, the
influencer managed to change the decision of the decision-maker from s to f .
However, note the impact of this effect depends on the environment. For in-
stance, if the utility of f are null and that of s are maximal, there is no effect
that will make a decision-maker with a weight on l 6= 1 change its decision from
s to f . Similarly, if the decision-maker has a weight equal to 0 on the criterion
l, then all effects have no impact.
4.3 Optimal Effect
We now illustrate the definition of the optimal policy pi∗j , and of the correspond-
ing optimal effect η∗xy. Let us define the environments e1 = [s 7→ (1, 1); f 7→
(0, 2)] or e2 = [s 7→ (1, 1); f 7→ (1, 2)] (i.e., respectively corresponding to the
observations θ1 and θ2 defined above). We assume that the influencer aj is
able to measure a probability of each environment from the set of all possi-
ble ones to take place e1, e2 ∈ E , when observing θj : p(e1 | θj = θ1) = 0.7 and
p(e2 | θj = θ2) = 0.3, respectively.
We consider here the case where the influencer worries more about the trust
of connection rather than the strength of signal, and so the weight function
for the utility function of the impact function is defined as w(e, t) = 0.6 and
w(e, r) = 0.4, for any environment e. It follows that ρi(e1, s) = 0 and ρi(e1, f) =
1, while ρi(e2, s) = 1 ρi(e2, f) = 0. In other words s and f are the alternatives
preferred by the influencer in e1 and e2, respectively. Let us finally consider the
probabilities associated with the observations of the decision-maker. We assume
that in e1, ai is certain to observe θ1, while in e2, ai can observe either θ1 or
θ2. More precisely, we define p(θi = θ1 | e1) = 1, p(θi = θ1 | e2) = 0.2 and
p(θi = θ2 | e2) = 0.8.
To select an optimal effect η∗xy, we have to compute the impact of each effect,
and select the one with the minimal impact. For instance, given the decision
maker described above, i.e., associating a weight of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.2 to the trust,
the strength and the color of a network, respectively, we can calculate that for any
context c, pij(θ1, ηRG(c)) = f , while pij(θ1, ηxy(c)) = s for any ηxy 6= ηRG (details
can be found in Appendix B, Table 2). Hence, we have that δi(θ1, e1, ηRG) = 1,
and δi(θ1, e1, ηxy) = 0 for any ηxy 6= ηRG. In other words, if the influencer knows
that the environment e1, then any effect but ηRG is optimal.
We can similarly compute δi(θ1, e2, η) equals 0 if η = ηRG and equals 1
otherwise, (i.e, the case dual to θ1 and e1) and δi(θ2, e2, η) equals 1 if η = ηGR
and equals 0 otherwise (details can be found in Appendix B, Table 2 and 3). We
can then compute the global impact of each effect given the initial observation
of the influencer. Writing γj(θj , η) =
∑
e∈E p(e|θj)
∑
θi∈Θi p(θi|e)δi(θi, e, η), we
have:
γj(θ1, η) =

0.7 if η = ηRG,
0.3 if η = ηGR,
0.06 otherwise.
In other words, there is evidence against applying strong effects ηRG and ηGR
that ‘swap’ the choice of the decision maker, since they can have a bad impact
when applied wrongly, while the other effects are all equally optimal.
This example shows that small differences applied to changing presentation of
each alternative does not necessarily change the decision-maker selection strat-
egy, i.e., changing the color of only one network might not have any impact.
Furthermore, and perhaps one illustration of the interest of influence with re-
spect to traditional enforcement mechanisms, “doing nothing” (or presenting
both alternatives in the same or neutral color) can be one of the best options
in these cases. Clearly, this situation is due to the uncertainty relative to the
influencer, which is not able to capture precisely the impact of its influence.
5 Extensions
The model we have presented so far does not depend on explicit time, and is lim-
ited to a single influencer per decision-maker. Although this model was enough
to express the core contribution of our approach, which is the quantification of
the flexible enforcement of security policies, following nudging techniques, more
complex models might be required. We now present two extensions, the first
introducing time and the second allowing multiple influencers.
System Evolution In several cases, the observation made by a decision-maker
or an influencer at time t depends on the decisions made at time t′ < t. For
instance, in the WiFi example, if one network is not encrypted, selecting it
might lead to the decision-maker to decide to set up its own encryption system.
In addition, the effects applied on the context at time t might persist at
time t′ > t. In this case, we could define ct+1i = ηi(c
t
i), where c
t
i denotes the
context of the agent ai at time t. In general, given an agent ai influenced by
aj we have the following dependencies at time t: (i) The observations θ
t
i and θ
t
j
depend on the environment et and can depend on decisions made by all agents
(not restricted to ai and aj) in the system at time t
′ < t; (ii) The decision made
by aj depends on the observation θ
t
j ; (iii) The context c
t
i depends on the context
ct−1i and the decision pi
t
j(θ
t
j) made by aj at time t (and on the decision made by
other influencers if any); (iv) The decision made by ai depends on θ
t
i and c
t
i.
In order to avoid loops in the decision process, the environment et should not
depend on decision made at time t, but can however depend on decisions made
at time t′ < t.
Multiple Influencers In practice, a single decision-maker is influenced by
multiple influencers. For instance, the employee of a company can be influenced
both by the business department, in order to increase productivity, and by the
technical department, in order to increase security.
However, several difficulties arise from the consideration of multiple influ-
encers. The first one is the ordering of the effect application. Indeed, the impact
of applying different effects coming from different influencers might be differ-
ent according to the order in which they are applied. For instance, consider the
WiFi effects ηll′ as described in Section 4: clearly, the last effect applied takes
over all effects previously applied. In order to address this problem, we could
only consider commutative effects: given η, η′ ∈ Ni, η ◦ η′ = η′ ◦ η. A more gen-
eral approach is to define an effect scheduler, which collects the effects from the
different influencers, and applies them on the context.
The second difficulty is that of influencing loops. Indeed, due to the syn-
chronicity of the application of effects, aj and ak could influence each other
mutually, potentially indirectly, which means that the alternative chosen by aj
depends on that chosen by ak, which itself depends on that chosen by aj , thus
creating a loop. Note that strictly speaking, since an influencer does not use a
context, it cannot be influenced, so as long as the observation at a given time
do not depend on the decisions made at the same time, there cannot be such
loops. However, being able to characterise a chain of influence seems appealing
to model some real-world scenarios (for instance, the influences that can come
through the different levels of management in a company), in which case a pos-
sible solution is to delay the application of an effect, such that the effect chosen
by aj at time t is only applied to the context of ai at t+ 1.
Note that a particularly interesting case for considering multiple influencers
is when one of the influencers is a malicious agent. In this case, the motivation of
an influencer aj can be to counter the influence of another agent over ai. In this
case, aj can aim at selecting the inverse effect to that chosen by the malicious
agent.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have proposed a formalization of the concept of influence in
information security systems based on a multi-agents approach. We have il-
lustrated the approach with an example of selection a public WiFi, and have
shown that due to uncertainty when making such security decisions, different
effects may be optimal. In particular, in some cases not influencing will be the
best strategy to follow, since influencing towards the wrong alternative can be
counter-productive.
We believe we have made a first step towards adapting multi-attribute utility
theory to deviations of human behavior from the rational one currently studied
in behavioral economics and organizational psychology, see e.g. [12] and [11].
Further extensions can be considered, such as the integration of expected un-
certain utility theory [8], which operates on interval utilities when modelling
decision maker preferences. It also differentiates between attitude towards and
perception of risk, which is particularly important for security decisions. Taking
into account complexity of different criteria, such as ‘trust’ criterion, MAUT
contribution may be further investigated by modeling more complex shapes of
marginal utility functions, such as convex or concave utility functions corre-
sponding to risk attitude (risk-prone or risk-averse) of decision maker, when
compared to the linear marginal utility functions modelled here. Finally, the
quantities obtained through MAUT can be used to characterize the strength of
the effect applied, following for instance our recent approach in the context of
quantitative access control policies [15].
In addition to the color effect, there is a large experience of behavioral sciences
when developing and implementing security products revealed recently [14], [17],
and other effects should be studied in the context of framework. For instance,
in [20], in addition to the color, the ordering of the different networks presented
to the decision maker by default is shown to have an impact.
Finally, the WiFi scenario provides an interesting basis for future work. For
instance, in [7], the importance of name when choosing a WiFi was studied in the
context of trust. Actually, the ‘trust’ criterion is interesting in itself, as it may
take into account various information, e.g. about the current location of the de-
cision maker to avoid situations, where the most trusted network for a researcher
located in a commercial center far away from university campuses appears to be
the ‘eduroam’ WiFi, an internationally available network for all researchers and
academic staff of universities provided within campuses of universities only.
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A Proofs
Proposition 1 The optimal policy for an influencer aj is defined by, for any θj:
pi∗j (θj) = arg min
η∈Aj
[∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, η)
]
Proof. Let us show that ∆pi
∗
i (e) ≤ ∆pii (e), for any environment e and any policy
pi. By definition of pi∗j , we have, for any θj :∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pi∗j (θj))
≤
∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pij(θj))
We can safely multiply by p(θj) on both sides since it is always positive:
p(θj)
∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pi∗j (θj))
≤ p(θj)
∑
e∈E
p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pij(θj))
Summing over all possible θj and factoring, we have:∑
θj∈Θj
∑
e∈E
p(θj)p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pi∗j (θj))
≤
∑
θj∈Θj
∑
e∈E
p(θj)p(e | θj)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pij(θj))
Using Bayes theorem, it follows:∑
θj∈Θj
∑
e∈E
p(e)p(θj | e)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pi∗j (θj))
≤
∑
θj∈Θj
∑
e∈E
p(e)p(θj | e)
∑
θi∈Θi
p(θi | e) δi(θi, e, pij(θj))
Using Definition 2 we conclude after refactoring that:∑
e∈E
p(e)∆pi
∗
i (e) ≤
∑
e∈E
p(e)∆pii (e)
B Tables
Table 2. Impact of all effects for any context c and the observation θ1 in the environ-
ments e1 and e2, where ρi(e1, s) = 0, ρi(e1, f) = 1, ρi(e2, s) = 1 and ρi(e2, f) = 0.
ηxy v(θ1, ηxy(c), s) v(θ1, ηxy(c), f) pii(θ1, ηxy(c)) δi(θ1, e1, ηxy) δi(θ1, e1, ηxy)
ηNN 0.5 0.4 s 0 1
ηNR 0.5 0.3 s 0 1
ηNG 0.5 0.5 s 0 1
ηGN 0.6 0.5 s 0 1
ηRN 0.4 0.4 s 0 1
ηGR 0.6 0.3 s 0 1
ηRG 0.4 0.5 f 1 0
ηRR 0.4 0.3 s 0 1
ηGG 0.6 0.5 s 0 1
Table 3. Impact of all effects for any context c and the observation θ2 in the environ-
ment e2, where ρi(e2, s) = 1 and ρi(e2, f) = 0.
ηxy v(θ2, ηxy(c), s) v(θ2, ηxy(c), f) pii(θ2, ηxy(c)) δi(θ2, e2, ηxy)
ηNN 0.5 0.65 f 0
ηNR 0.5 0.55 f 0
ηNG 0.5 0.75 f 0
ηGN 0.6 0.65 f 0
ηRN 0.4 0.65 f 0
ηGR 0.6 0.55 s 1
ηRG 0.4 0.75 f 0
ηRR 0.4 0.55 f 0
ηGG 0.6 0.75 f 0
